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MEXICAN FAMILIES & UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION REFORM
Bernard Trujillo*
ABSTRACT
This essay argues that we should understand U.S. immigration policy as
a series of bi-national relationships rather than as a single, user-indifferent
interface. Applying this regulatory approach to Mexican labor migration
(i) allows a more accurate definition of the migrating person in the context
of the family he seeks to support; and (ii) highlights the United States' duty
to provide for Mexican families.
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INTRODUCTION
"If you have the facts, argue the facts. If you have the law, argue the
law." This old lawyers' adage captures the profile of current debates about
reforming U.S. immigration policy. Well-intentioned people, some armed
with the facts and others with the law, talk past each other. Advocates of
strict enforcement finger well-worn copies of the statutes and color their
opponents as scofflaws. Proponents of a comprehensive legal re-write
* Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. A.B., Princeton University (1988); J.D.,
Yale Law School (1992). Thanks to Jay Conison, Marc Galanter, Kevin R. Johnson, Steve
Legomsky, JoEllen Lind, Michael A. Olivas, and Victoria Trujillo.
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brandish social and economic data and suggest that their antagonists are be-
ing fastidious about the ancillaries.
This essay suggests that immigration reform should correlate the law
with the facts. Part I of this essay clarifies several elements necessary to
define the field and initiate the analysis. The essay utilizes a bi-state ap-
proach to immigration. I will argue that U.S. immigration policy ultimately
owes a duty to Mexican families.
Part II briefly reviews some of the data describing migration patterns,
and Part III shows the lawful means of entry that the immigration system
provides for migrants from the defined field. The essay concludes by
summarizing some recommendations of how the U.S. may better regulate
Mexican migration.
I. FIELD DEFINITION
It is important to first define, then to measure, and finally to regulate.
Therefore, Part I offers a "field definition" for the phenomena the United
States is trying to regulate.'
A. Bi-State Methodology
One general (and generally admired) characteristic of the law is its user-
indifference. No matter who violates the law or applies for its benefits, the
law is the same for everyone. Immigration law, just like tax or criminal
law, is no respecter of persons. Thus, U.S. immigration law is organized
like any other domestic law; it provides benefits and burdens to all poten-
tial immigrants alike.2
Observations of migration to the United States, however, demonstrate
that migrants always come from somewhere. Migrants do not drop out of
1. See generally Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Vari-
ation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 483, 531-35 (following the work of Sally Falk
Moore on defining "semi-autonomous social fields"). Field definitions are less a stable
structure than a communicable "way of seeing." I thank my friend Marc Galanter for the
latter phrase and insight.
2. There are important exceptions to the general characterization of U.S. immigration
law as treating all sending-nations alike. Most notably, the visa waiver program provides
streamlined entry procedures for some applicants from a list of nations with which the
United States is on excellent terms. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 217, 8 U.S.C. §
1187 (2006); see also 2-12 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
12.04 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2010) (listing the current visa waiver countries as Andorra,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, San
Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom).
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the sky or appear mysteriously at points of entry. Every migrant to the
United States comes from a certain sending country. These measurable
patterns of sending provide crucial regulatory information. Ignoring the
sending country as an explanatory variable yields a sad sort of policy so-
lipsism.
United States immigration law is typically seen as an expression with
two terms: a single receiver-country (the United States) interfacing simul-
taneously with applicants from a vector of 194 sender-countries. 3 It might
be more useful, however, to re-imagine U.S. immigration as an expression
containing 194 terms, each representing a bi-state relationship:4 United
States and Slovenia, United States and Togo, etc. Attempting such a series
of pair-wise analyses would establish U.S. immigration regulation as an ex-
tension of U.S. diplomatic strategy generally.
When we re-imagine U.S. immigration policy as a series of bi-state ana-
lyses, new regulatory horizons open up. Particular expertise for immigra-
tion regulation would come less from the Department of Homeland Securi-
ty (DHS), and more from the Department of State (DOS). The DHS is
charged with the task of defending one homeland from many potential
threats, ranging from terrorists to tornados. The DOS, on the other hand, is
charged with the task of developing specific relationships with various and
unique countries. To do the job well, the DOS cultivates country-specific
databases and relationships. These resources, already at the disposal of the
DOS's diplomatic mission, could also be made available to the immigration
regulators.
More generally, immigration could be regulated as a continuous, rather
than binary, phenomenon. A binary variable always takes one of two val-
ues: it is either on or off, either zero or one.5 When immigrants seek entry,
a binary regulatory approach views them as either the right or wrong kind
of immigrants, and they will either be admitted or rejected on this basis. A
continuous variable, on the other hand, can take any value along a range.6
3. It may be useful to express these terms mathematically. Thus, U.S. 1 [P], P2, P3 ....
P194] where p is a given country. The U.S. relates to a vector of countries (e.g., Afghanistan,
Albania, Algeria.... Zimbabwe), where each country is non-unique for the purposes of the
relation.
4. Thus, U.S.I P1, US.I p2, US.I p, ... U.S. p194. Of course, the focus of this research
is U.S.IMexico.
5. See, e.g., W.J. Krzanowski, Discrimination and Classification Using Both Binary
and Continuous Variables, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL Assoc. 782, 782 (1975) (noting the "dis-
crete nature" of binary variables).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD COURANT & HERBERT ROBBINS, WHAT IS MATHEMATICS? 274 (2d
ed. 1996) ("The domain of variability of a continuous variable may be extended to infini-
ty.").
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Instead of categories that are coarse and stark, continuous regulation allows
gradations, fine-tuning, and just-in-time adjustments. With binary regula-
tion, the United States has no responsibilities for immigration until the mi-
grants materialize at its doors or are discovered in its interior. With conti-
nuous regulation, the U.S. shares responsibility for the ongoing patterns of
sending and receiving migrants. 7
B. Choosing Mexico
Because resources are limited, simultaneously pursuing 194 unique im-
migration policies is not feasible. It is obvious that a bi-state approach to
immigration regulation requires some prioritizing. It is equally obvious
that the U.S./Mexico policy would quickly make its way to the top of the
priority list.
Table 1. Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2007
Mexico 11,739,000
China 1,930,000
Philippines 1,701,000
India 1,502,000
El Salvador 1,104,000
Vietnam 1,101,000
Table 1 estimates the relative flows of immigrants from the top sending-
countries. 8 Suppose that a bi-state method of immigration regulation has
some competitive advantage over the conventional, user-indifferent inter-
face. The United States could capture a tremendous amount of that advan-
tage by developing bi-state policies for the six countries on this list, while
7. When we re-conceive immigration regulation as a continuous enterprise, United
States efforts at foreign development properly become a form of migration policy. Follow-
ing the New Economics of Labor Migration research, the United States can manage migra-
tion flows by, for example, helping to correct lapses in capital, employment, and insurance
markets in the sending country. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
8. See ELIZABETH M. GRIECO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN OF
THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 tbl.2 (2010).
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keeping the user-indifferent interface for the remaining 188 potential send-
ing states.9
A glance at Table 1 confirms that Mexico is, far and away, the most im-
portant piece of the U.S. immigration puzzle. Specifically, the size of the
Mexican-born population is more than six times the size of the second-
largest population, the Chinese-born. Following the numbers, this essay
attempts to contribute to the literature on U.S./Mexico immigration regula-
tion.
C. Defining the Migrating Person
The next step in designing a Mexico-specific user interface is to estab-
lish the characteristics of a population of relevant users. In the
U.S.iMexico field, as the essay has defined it, the "Migrating Person" (MP)
represents a member of that set of Mexicans who intend to migrate to the
United States in order to support his family with his low-skilled labor. '
0
The MP is thus understood as a migrant-in-context. The individual mi-
grant is seen in the context of both his actual community (the family he
supports and by whom he is sustained) and his operational community (the
means of his labor, by which he supports his family). Because of the signi-
ficance of support, the members of the MP's family must be defined nar-
rowly to include only spouse, minor children, and elderly parents of both
MP and spouse who lack other means of support.' 1
9. Some "sender-specific" migration works include: KEvIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD
TRUJILLO, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW REFORM AND THE U.S./MEXICAN BORDER: SI SE PUEDE?
(forthcoming 2011) (on file with author) (Mexico); Michael A. Olivas, The Arch of Triumph
and the Agony of Defeat: Mexican Americans and the Law (University of Houston Law
Center, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 2010-A-18, 2010), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract id= 1658516## (Mexico); Anupam
Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1005, pt. 4 (2001) (India); Kevin R. Johnson,
An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico Relations: The Tale of Two Trea-
ties, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 121 (1998) (Mexico); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersec-
tion of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 1 (2009); J. Edward Taylor et al., Migration and Incomes in Source Communi-
ties: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China, 52 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 75 (2003) (China); Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of
Mexico, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 713 [hereinafter Trujillo, Case of Mexico] (Mexico) (arguing for
demand-sensitive visa distribution).
10. The low-skilled labor migrant is a huge share of the Mexican migration to the Unit-
ed States. See JOHNSON & TRUJILLO, supra note 9, ch. 8.
11. This definition of family already exists in the federal regulations governing immi-
gration law. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(g)(1) (2010) (application for Canadian Border Boat Land-
ing Permit). Other instances of legal notice of social support include dependents in tax law,
and support in family law.
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At first glance, this focus on the Mexican worker/provider might seem to
be an instance of the law-and-economics approach to immigration law,
which also argues that we should increase our attention to the migrant-as-
worker. 12 A notable example of the law-and-economics approach to immi-
gration is the work of Adam Cox and Eric Posner, who have clarified the
role that "screening" plays in immigration policy. 13 To Cox and Posner,
"[t]he world presents a large pool of potential immigrants, and states have
to figure out how to separate those immigrants it considers desirable from
those it does not." 14 Other work has suggested that the U.S. should shift its
focus away from family-based immigration and move more resources to-
wards employment-based immigration, perhaps learning from Canadian
immigration policies that are designed to attract skilled and employable
migrants. 15
If one accepts the premise that migrants are primarily resources to be
harvested for the economic benefit of the receiving-state, then one may
conclude that the State's job is to screen migrants. This essay questions
both that premise and that conclusion. We thus focus on two questions: (i)
what is a migrant; and (ii) what is the role of the state in regulating migra-
tion.
What is the unit of analysis this essay is calling the "migrant"? In the
conventional neo-classical storyline, the migrant, as an economic actor, is a
solo performer. 16 He may be more or less rational, more or less free. He
may do a better or worse job of gathering information and maximizing
wealth. He may or may not have the arm to wield surely his power to con-
12. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
13. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract
Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Posner, Rights of Mi-
grants]; see also Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigra-
tion Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2007) [hereinafter Cox & Posner, Second-Order].
14. Cox & Posner, Rights of Migrants, supra note 13; see also Cox & Posner, Second-
Order, supra note 13.
15. See Stephen Macedo, The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy, in DEBATING
IMMIGRATION 67 (Carol A. Swain ed., 2007); GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 218-25 (2007). But see Matthew Lister, Im-
migration, Association, and the Family, LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with au-
thor). Lister has argued in favor of retaining emphasis on family-based immigration poli-
cies, contrary to the law-and-economics trend, in favor of more employment-based
immigration. Id. Lister bases his argument on the rights that citizens have to free associa-
tion. Id. My argument differs from Lister's in that I regard the families of all, citizens and
non-citizens alike, to be intrinsic to the "principal" (i.e., the citizen seeking family unifica-
tion benefits, or the non-citizen entering to work).
16. See, e.g., ODED STARK, THE MIGRATION OF LABOR 26 (1991) (noting that the con-
ventional "focus of migration theory" has been "individual independence," and arguing in-
stead for a focus on "mutual interdependence").
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tract. 17 But whatever he does, he is elementally alone. His character takes
the form of a prime, not a composite, number.' 8 This is sacred to the neo-
classical canon. 
19
By contrast, this essay defines the migrant not as an isolated iota, but ra-
ther as an iota raised to the power of a set of family members. 21 Observing
the nonlinearity in the expression, I argue that each migrant is a complex
system. The role of dependent family members is not affective (pictures in
a wallet) nor modular and severable (the next term after the + sign),2 but
rather intrinsic and operational. The MP carries inside of him each of his
family members, such that the total quantity is more than (or sometimes
less, but never equal to) the sum of its parts.22 The immigration regulator
must countenance the subjects of support, whether they reside in the host or
sending country.
What is the role of the state when it deals with migrants? For Cox and
Posner, the role of the state is to sort migrants into piles of "useful" and
"less useful," based on certain criteria (e.g., skills that may spur economic
growth).23 The state then contracts with the useful migrants, for the ulti-
mate benefit of the state and the potential ancillary benefit of the mi-
grants.24 In this way, immigration law acts as the Human Resources De-
partment of "U.S.A., Inc."
17. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-
14 (1976) (describing information limitations and other limitations on the behavior of the
rational actor).
18. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 16, at 5 (characterizng immigration modeling as con-
ventionally "individual independence," i.e., taking the actor as a prime, a unit of analysis
incapable of being boiled down, rather than "mutual interdependence," i.e., a composite, a
unit of analysis that contains important component parts).
19. See Michael Todaro & Lydia Maruszko, Illegal Migration and US. Immigration
Reform: A Conceptual Framework, 13 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 101 (1987) (refining the
micro theory of neoclassical economics and applying this theory to individual migrants).
20. This re-definition does not merely accrete, but rather complexifies, the iota.
21. Thus, t + 12 + 13 + . • in, where t, represents the anchor spouse and each subsequent
t represents the family members. For an example of modular treatment of migrants' fami-
lies, see Cox & Posner, Rights of Migrants, supra note 13, at 1438-41. In this sense, the
families of migrants are a sort of baggage.
22. We can thus define a given MP as ton, where the t is raised to the power of a given
family (shown as 0). See STEVEN H. STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SPONTA-
NEOUS ORDER 50-51 (2003) (defining linearity as modular (the whole being equal to the sum
of its parts) and nonlinearity as capable of complex behavior). See generally Bernard Trujil-
lo, Randomness and Complexity in Social Explanation: Evidence From Finance and Bank-
ruptcy Law, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (2008) (discussing legal applications of nonli-
near models).
23. See Cox & Posner, Rights of Migrants, supra note 13.
24. See id at 1408.
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Alongside the view that the host nation is solely a consumer of migrants,
this essay suggests that the state also bears the burden of providing for mi-
grants. Persons are real and durable in a way that states are not. It is un-
avoidable that states will ask, "what's in it for us?" But the twin aspiration
of U.S. immigration policy continues by asking, "what would we be if we
did not?" It is this second question that animates, for example, policy re-
garding refugees and asylum.25
Having suggested that the state has a role in providing for the MP, the
essay turns now to survey the data.
II. IF YOU HAVE THE FACTS, ARGUE THE FACTS
In a world without nations and nations' laws, what would we observe
about migration? Suppose migration was entirely a product of human be-
havior, regulated by endogenous factors such as actors' incentives and un-
regulated by exogenous factors such as law. Asking the question "What do
migrants want?," we turn to social science data provided by sociology and
economics.
Sociologist Douglas Massey and his colleagues have compiled and ana-
lyzed a tremendous amount of data on Mexican migration.26 These data
contain much information about what migrants want and what they will
withstand to get it.27
At least two theses arise from the Massey data. First, Mexican migrants
cross into the United States in order to work.28 The Mexican to U.S. flow
seems less dependent on border enforcement than on the strength of the
U.S. economy. 29 A second thesis concerns the phenomenon of return mi-
25. See generally, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees:
A Humanitarian Agenda (Jan. 1, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7bb534.html (focusing on
refugees' need for human security, rather than states' interest in profiting by admitting non-
citizens).
26. See MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT, http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/ (last visited Oct.
18, 2010); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 52-53 (2003) (referencing data col-
lected by the Mexican Migration Project).
27. See MASSEY ET AL., supra note 26; MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT, supra note 26.
28. See CROSSING THE BORDER: RESEARCH FROM THE MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT 6-7(Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey eds., 2006) [hereinafter CROSSING THE BORDER] (ar-
guing that Mexicans migrate to earn income in order to overcome Mexico-specific market
failure, e.g., mortgage market).
29. See When Less is More: Border Enforcement and Undocumented Migration: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int'l Law,
110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Douglas S. Massey) [hereinafter Statement of Douglas
S. Massey] (stating that Mexican migration continues during buildups of border controls);
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS: How MANY COME? How
MANY LEAVE?, at i (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?Report
422 [Vol. XX-XVIII
MEXICAN FAMILIES
gration.30 Return migration describes a situation in which a migrant enters
the host country to work and after a time returns to the sending country.
31
This cycle might be repeated seasonally, over many years.
32
According to the Massey data, return migration, which had been the
normal expectation of the low-skilled Mexican migrant, has been inter-
rupted by U.S. efforts at enhanced border control.33 While the flows from
Mexico continue, they become one-way, affecting what this essay will call
"northern capture." 34 The migrants who cross to the United States choose
to remain in the United States rather than return to Mexico and bear anew
the risks of crossing.
35
An intriguing, and perhaps counter-intuitive, implication of the Massey
data is that the "best" border control might be a weak border control. With
weakened border control, we might see more return migration and less
northern capture. Weakened border control would not only reduce costs
borne by the U.S. (e.g., northern capture), it would also reduce the severe
costs bome by migrants, such as border deaths and coyote hijackings.
36
Economic research complements the picture of migrant behavior. Clas-
sical "push/pull" stories represent the migrant as a ball on a slope: If the
wage differential between a sending and receiving country crosses a certain
ID=112 (noting that the inflow of immigrants from Mexico to the United States has declined
since the middle of the decade).
30. See CROSSING THE BORDER, supra note 28, at 12; MASSEY ET AL., supra note 26, at
130-33 (theorizing that increased border control lowers return migration probability).
31. The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) research provides theoretical
backing to the "return migration" phenomenon. See infra note 40.
32. See id.
33. See CROSSING THE BORDER, supra note 28, at 12 (prior to 1992, the probability of a
Mexican migrant returning to Mexico was between .60 and .70; by 1996, the probability
was .45). The Mexican Migration Project estimates that by 2007, the probability had
dropped to .05. See Probability of Return Within 12 Months, MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT,
http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/010returnpers-en.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
34. See generally Alfredo Corchado, Immigrants' Road to Prosperity Becoming One-
Way Route North: Highly Patrolled Border Curtailing Visits Home for Many Mexicans,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 1, 2001, at Al.
35. Mexicans de afuera (i.e., those who have migrated out of Mexico and have been
subject to northern capture) are self-selected for youth, energy, skills, and intangibles such
as daringness. See JOHNSON & TRUJILLO, supra note 9, ch. 8 (listing data on the characteris-
tics of the migrating population, including youth, skills, and education level). The missing
Mexican middle class (i.e., a missing middle in variables such as youth and skills), may
have a destabilizing effect on Mexican society, which in turn may make it more likely prey
for political and narcotics-based corruption.
36. See Statement of Douglas S. Massey, supra note 29, figs.4 & 6 (data on border
deaths and coyote costs); Randal C. Archibold, 72 Migrants Found Dead on a Ranch in
Mexico, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 2010, at A4 (reporting seventy-two migrants killed by drug
hijackers on ranch).
2010]
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threshold, the ball rolls down the slope (i.e., the migrant leaves home for
host country in search of better wages). 37 Neo-classical theories of migra-
tion continue this focus on wage differentials between the sending and re-
ceiving countries. 38
More recent research, generally called the "New Economics of Labor
Migration" (NELM), attempts to flesh out the neo-classical story in at least
two ways. 39 First, NELM suggests that the migrant does not act in isola-
tion, but rather as a representative or agent of his or her family.40 The
household, in effect, sends the migrant as a sort of financial intermediary
both to earn income that helps the household to achieve specific goals, and
to overcome certain limitations in the home economic environment.4 '
These limitations appear not only in the local job market, but also in the
capital markets and the insurance markets.42
Second, this re-casting of the migrant as financial intermediary for his
family illuminates the phenomenon of "return migration." In pre-NELM
models, return migration was typically seen as a failure of the migrant to
achieve her goals.43 NELM suggests that the migrant planned to return-
migrate from the very beginning.44 NELM thus argues that return migra-
tion forms part of the basic structure of migration and is not the result of
migrant miscalculation.
37. Examples of push/pull models, also called "gravity" models, are Samuel A. Stouffer,
Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 845
(1940), and Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, 3 DEMOGRAPHY 47 (1966).
38. The Harris-Todaro model is the basic statement of the neo-classical story. See John
R. Harris & Michael P. Todaro, Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two-Sector
Analysis, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 126 (1970).
39. Significant proponents of NELM research include J. Edward Taylor and Philip Mar-
tin. See, e.g., J. Edward Taylor & Philip L. Martin, Human Capital: Migration and Rural
Population Change, in IA HANDBOOK OF AGRICULTURAL EcONOMICs 457 (Bruce L. Gard-
ner & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 2001).
40. J. Edward Taylor, Migration Models, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULATION 640 (Paul
George Demeny & Geoffrey McNicoll eds., 2003) ("NELM models hypothesize that migra-
tion decisions are made not by isolated actors but by larger units of related people, typically
households or families; that people act collectively not only to maximize income but also to
minimize risks and loosen constraints created by various inadequacies of markets in source
areas, including missing or incomplete capital and insurance markets; and that migration
decisions may be influenced by the behavior of other actors within the prospective migrant's
social group.").
41. See id. at 643.
42. See id. at 255.
43. See Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach
to Return Migrants Revisited, 6 INT'L J. ON MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 253, 255 (2004).
44. See id.
424 [Vol. XXXVIII
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III. IF YOU HAVE THE LAW, ARGUE THE LAW
The essay has defined a population of Mexican MPs as those who mi-
grate to the United States in order to support their families by providing
low-skilled labor in exchange for wages. What does U.S. immigration law
provide for that population? Figure 1 shows that the answer is "not much."
Figure 1. Lawful Means of Entry for Mexican Migrating Persons
ZERO
Immediate Relatives of Citizens
Family-Based Preferences [Focus: F-8 M Spouse
unify the families of citizens) minor children of LPRS
Employment-Based Preferences E-B 3: "Other Workers*
ZERO
H-2A Seasonal Agricultural Worker
There are three main ways of gaining lawful entry into the United States:
"Legal Permanent Resident" (LPR) admission, "Non-Immigrant Visa"
(NIV) admission, and admission as a refugee or through asylum.
LPR admissions, also known as "green cards," provide minimal access
for Mexican MPs. Six hundred and seventy five thousand green cards are
available annually,45 and the vast majority of them go to unify the families
45. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). There
are 480,000 family-sponsored visas. Id. § 1151 (c). The actual distribution of these visas will
vary based on the number of visas distributed to immediate relatives of citizens under §
1151(b)(2)(A). See id § 1151(b)(2)(A) There are 140,000 employment-sponsored visas.
See § l151(d)(1)(A). There are 55,00 diversity visas. See id. § 1151(e). This number has
been reduced to 50,000 for the foreseeable future based on distributions under the Nicara-
guan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 203(d)(1), 111
Stat. 2160 (1997).
88,000 available, but functionally
ZERO for the defined Population
10,000 (including both Enchors
and followers-to-join); severely
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of citizens.46 The largest, uncapped category is available only to citizens
who bring in their immediate family members. 47 The second largest cate-
gory, capped at 480,000 green cards annually, is primarily dedicated to un-
ifying the families of citizens, but 88,000 of the green cards belonging to
this group are available to bring in the spouse and minor children of those
who are already LPRs. 8 Since the anchor spouse must already have the
status of an LPR, this category is effectively unavailable to the previously
defined Population of Mexican MPs.
Of the 140,000 "employment-based" green cards that can be distributed
annually, 49 most of them are available only to bring in highly-skilled and
well-educated workers, or migrants with substantial means.5 ° Of these
140,000 employment-based green cards, only 10,000 are available for
members of the defined Population, 51 and that number is substantially di-
minished by imposition of the per-country limits. 52 For a Mexican appli-
cant, the waiting time for one of these green cards can run upwards of nine
years. 5
3
46. Green cards are distributed, without annual quota, to the immediate relatives of citi-
zens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A). Among the five family-sponsored visa categories listed
at § 1153(a), three go to unite the families of citizens. See id. 1153(a)(1), (3), (4). The other
two categories are available for the families of Legal Permanent Residents. See id §
1153(a)(2)(A) (spouses and children); id § 1153(a)(2)(B) (unmarried sons and daughters
under twenty-one years of age); see also id. § 1 101(b)(1).
47. Id. § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) (defining immediate relatives of citizens).
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(B) (authorizing a target of 114,200 green cards to be dis-
tributed in the family-sponsored category for LPRs, with not less than .77 of that number
(87,934) going to unify LPRs with their spouses and minor children). As always, actual vi-
sas will vary, since the number of family-sponsored visas is adjusted based on the number of
visas distributed to the immediate relatives of citizens under 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (b)(2)(A). See
id § 1153(a)(2)(B).
49. See id. § 1151(d)(1)(A).
50. See id. § 1153(b) (authorizing the employment-based preference categories). All of
the employment-based visas except those specified in § 1153(b)(3) (known as "EB-3" visas)
are available only to professional workers or entrepreneurs. See id.
51. The defined Population comprises the "other workers" section of EB-3. See id. §
1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), (b)(3)(B). The 10,000 visas available in the "other workers" section of
EB-3 have been reduced to 5000 for the foreseeable future based on distributions under the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 203(e),
111 Stat. 2160 (1997).
52. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2). In earlier work, I have criticized the application of the
per-country limits in the Mexican case. See Trujillo, Case of Mexico, supra note 9, at 718-
19 (critiquing demand-insensitive distribution of goods).
53. The Department of State (DOS) releases a monthly bulletin used by practitioners to
estimate the waiting time for a green card. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Visa Bulletin, TRA-
VEL.STATE.GOv, http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin 1360.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2010) (providing links to upcoming, current, and archived visa bulletins). For an extended
discussion of the DOS visa bulletin, see Trujillo, Case of Mexico, supra note 9. In figure
one, the horizontal axis specifies the sending country; the vertical axis specifies the prefe-
2010] MEXICAN FAMILIES
The final set of green cards is available by lottery to applicants from fa-
vored nations, mostly in Europe and Africa.54 Applicants from Asia and
Latin America have severely limited access to this set of 55,000 "diversity"
green cards, and access for applicants from the highest traffic countries, in-
cluding Mexico, is barred completely.
55
Besides green cards, migrants can also gain lawful admission as "non-
immigrant visa-holders" (NIVs).56 United States immigration law general-
ly countenances that NIVs will come to the United States for a limited time
only, and then return to the sending country.57 There are many NIV cate-
gories, most of them dedicated to high-skilled workers, short-term visitors,
and students.58 Members of the Mexican MP Population generally enter on
either the H-2A (farm-worker) or the H-2B (non-agricultural temporary
worker) category.59 There is no annual cap on H-2A visas, but data from
2002 to 2006 shows that an average of about 33,000 are distributed each
year.60 H-2B visas are capped annually at 66,000.61 Spouses and minor
children of these NIVs can "follow-to-join" the anchor spouse.62
rence category under which the applicant is seeking admission; the date in the cell is the ap-
plication date of those for whom visas are now available. Trujillo, Case of Mexico, supra
note 9, at 713-14 fig.1. Literally, a "waiting time of nine years" means that applicants who
applied nine years ago are now receiving visas.
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c); U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2006 YEARBOOK OF IMMI-
GRATION STATISTICS 32 tbl.11, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
yearbook/2006/OIS_2006_Yearbook.pdf (describing the distribution of diversity visas by
region).
55. See 8 U.S.C. § 11 53(c)(1)(B)(i)(I) (requiring the Attorney General to identify "high
admissions states" for exclusion from the diversity lottery); GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURES, supra note 2, § 40.4(5)(b) ("Natives of the following nineteen coun-
tries were excluded from participating in the DV-2010 program because they sent a total of
more than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the previous five fiscal years: Brazil,
Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Peru, Poland, South
Korea, the United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) and its dependent territories, and
Vietnam.").
56. See 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15).
57. See, e.g., id. § 1 101(a)(15)(B) (stipulating that an applicant must convince an immi-
gration officer that the applicant has a home in the sending country to which she intends to
return).
58. See generally id. § 1 101(a)(15)(A)-(V). For example, § 1 101(a)(15)(B) covers visi-
tors for business or pleasure and § 1101(a)(15)(F) covers foreign students.
59. See id. § 1101(a)(15)(H).
60. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY CLASSIFICATION
FISCAL YEARS 2002-2006 tbl.XVI(B) [hereinafter DHS FY2002-06].
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(B). Despite the fact that the number is capped by statute,
the data show that an average of 75,000 H-2B visas were distributed from 2002 to 2006.
See DHS FY2002-06, supra note 60.
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(iii). The last sentence of § 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) autho-
rizes admission of the spouse and immediate family members of the H-3 applicant; these are
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Finally, a migrant can enter the United States as a refugee, or be granted
asylum upon showing a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to the
sending country.63 Unless a member of the defined Population (i.e., Mex-
icans coming to support families with low-skilled labor) happens to also
possess a well-founded fear of persecution (say, from drug corruption), the
refugee and asylum categories are largely unavailable to these MPs.
In summary, the members of the defined Population may have a shot at a
few hundred employment-based green cards, for which they will have to
wait over nine years. They also have access to about 100,000 NIVs annual-
ly. All told, there are about 100,000 lawful entry points for low-skilled la-
borers, a remarkably low number, given the typically huge demand for such
labor.64
In light of these numbers, what can be expected? The rational U.S. regu-
lator must expect that both the suppliers and demanders of low-skilled la-
bor will resort to self-help mechanisms that circumvent the law. "En-
forcement first" bromides ring hollow when the rules to be enforced are so
completely out of touch with reality.
CONCLUSION
The regulatory environment should adapt to the facts in at least four
ways. First, U.S. immigration law should move from a "user-indifferent"
interface to a series of bi-state analyses. Foremost among these analyses
should be an immigration interface that is specific to the U.S./Mexico rela-
tionship. Second, U.S. immigration law should more sharply define the
Mexican MP. It should reject conventional modular definitions of the mi-
grant and understand the Mexican MP in the context of the family, both as
an object of support and subject of sustenance. Third, the state, as regula-
tor of migration, should likewise be more sharply defined. Alongside the
image of state-as-consumer-of-migrants, we should resuscitate the image of
state-as-provider. Last, U.S. immigration law, thus re-conceived, must
broaden its notice of the family. The law already commits substantial re-
sources to provide for the families of U.S. citizens. In order to properly
and effectively regulate migration, the law must recognize that it also owes
a duty to Mexican families.
the so-called "H-4" admissions. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2) (2010). It is not clear how many
low-skilled NIVs utilize the H4 "following to join" provisions. Data from 2002 to 2006
show an average of only about 75,000 H-4 visas per year, with many of those going to the
"followers to join" of high-skilled anchor spouses. See DHS FY2002-06, supra note 60.
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(A).
64. See JOHNSON & TRUJILLO, supra note 9, ch. 5.
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